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Lockwood: The Intent and Implementation of the ESA: A Matter of Scale

THE INTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE ESA: A MATTER OF SCALE
Jeffrey A. Lockwood
Simon Levin noted that "[scale is] the fundamental conceptual
problem in ecology, if not in all of science." 2 Often, what we believe to
be opposing theories are a matter of equally valid concepts being
advanced at different scales. 3 As such, when intelligent people's
perceptions are in conflict, the tension may be a function of mismatched
scales, rather than diametrically opposed philosophies. The debate which
has arisen in the context of the application of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) on private property may be such a conflict. It has been said that
the ESA pits "the nation's fierce obsession with self-determination and
private property versus its love of the wilderness and compassion for
wildlife. "'

The goal of this analysis is to take a scale-based perspective in
examining the fundamental principles of the ESA and private property
rights. The hazard of this approach is that, not being a social scientist, I
may not fully appreciate the context of this conflict. The advantage is
being able to bring an ecologist's perspective to an arena that has been
dominated by development and commodity interests of the "wise use"
movement and various environmental organizations and animal rights
groups comprising the Endangered Species Coalition.5
THE TEMPORAL SCALE
Conflicts of Intent
While opponents of the ESA point out that extinction is the ultimate
fate of all species, 6 this truism fails to recognize that the current extinc-

1. Bachelor of Science in Biology from the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
in 1982. Ph.D in Entomology from Louisiana State University in 1986. Currently Professor of Plant,
Soil & Insect Sciences at the University of Wyoming.
2. Simon A. Levin, The Problem of Patternand Scale in Ecology, 73 ECOLOGY 1943 (1992).
3. See T.F.H. ALLEN & THOMAS W. HOEKSTRA, TOWARD A UNIFIED ECOLOGY (1992).
4. Margaret Kriz, Caught in the Act, NAT'L J.,Dec. 1995, at 3090.

5. Elizabeth Losos, The Future of the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 8 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY
& EVOLTON 332, 335 (1993).
6. Tom Bethel, Species Logic, AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Aug. 1995, at 20.
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tion rate is at least 1,000-times the normal rate of species loss. 7 Although
the public may believe that our major environmental problems have been
solved,' the loss of species is unabated at a global level, with a loss of
some 20,000 species per year. 9 Due to the ESA, we have made demonstrable progress toward arresting this alarming trend in the United States
Whereas over 500 species are known to have been lost from the U.S. in
the 200 years prior to the Act, only seven extinctions have been documented in this country in the twenty-one years since its passage."°
Even decade-long perspectives may be alien to those private property
owners who purchase property as a short-term investment, without the
intent to live on, let alone steward, the land." Land speculation will be
increasingly lucrative as our population continues to grow. Where lands
are owned with the intent of sustaining their ecological functions (e.g.,
producing forage, crops or timber) within a multigenerational family
network, conflicts with the ESA will not disappear, but the time-frame for
constructive dialogue would not be defined by a race to convert the land

to immediate anthropocentric use.
Conflicts of Implementation
Kubasek and Browne noted that, "[f]or many, the major problems

arising from the Act stem not so much from any inherent flaws in the
structure of the legislation, but rather from problems of enforcement and
funding." 2 This is a common notion, and it suggests that we can resolve
species-property conflicts by creatively implementing the Act. Even the
process which permits harm to endangered species (i.e., Habitat Conservation Plan) often may be viewed as being a serious impediment to the
property owner, who must act quickly to exploit opportunities to "develop" the land. 3 Although ESA procedures are extremely fast in terms of
ecological time, the implementation of the Act is viewed as cumbersome
in economic time-scales.

7. See Randall Cortez Wilson, Triage and the Endangered Species Act, TRANSACTIONS OF
THE 60TH WILDuFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE (1995).

8.
presented
9.
10.

Mollie Beatie, The EndangeredSpecies Act. Myths and Realities 1 (May 20,1995) (Paper
at the Society of Environmental Journalists Meeting).
Wilson, supra note 7.
See Jason M. Patis, Biodiversity, Ecosystems and Species: Where Does the Enlangered

Species Act FitIn?, 8 TUL. ENVIL. L.J. 33 (1994).
11. See generally WES JACKSON, NEW ROOTS FOR AGRICULTURE (1980).

12. Nancy R. Kubasek & M. Neil Browne, The EndangeredSpecies Act: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches. 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1. 11 (1994).
13. See Bruce Babbitt, The EndangeredSpecies Act and "Takings": A Callfor Innovation with-

in the Terms of the Act. 24 ENVTL. L. 355 (1994).
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The time-scale of the ESA is based on ecological processes, which
are fundamentally slower than the rates of development and extractive
projects on private property. The intent of the Act is intergenerational,
while the profits to be made on development of private property are often
immediate. This is not to say that the ESA is disconnected from economic
concerns. As noted by Watkins, the truth is that our economy depends on
the sustained health of the environment. What is economic in the long run
is what conserves endangered species 4 - a realization that is substantiated by the loss of 40,000 coastal fishery jobs with the decline of salmon
and the struggles of fruit growers in Guam who are overwhelmed by fruit
flies that had been kept in check by a now-endangered bat.
The rate of species' recovery is a complex function of biological
attributes, 6 and no legislation can change ecological time-scales. Many
endangered species have lost more than 90 percent of their habitat to anthropogenic factors in the last 200 years,' 7 and the ESA could not reasonably have led to the recovery of many of these species in just two decades."8 This temporal difficulty has led to the suggestion that rather than
reacting at the brink of extinction, we should take proactive measures to
prevent such crises. 9 However, this dichotomy of tactics may be misleading; the "nick of time" context of the ESA is proactive to the extent that
endangered species are warnings that entire communities and ecosystems
are at risk.
The ESA has been criticized by conservation biologists for not having a sufficiently long temporal perspective. Shaffer suggested that a
population should be considered as viable if it has a 99 percent chance of
surviving for 1,000 years in the face of stochastic factors." But actions
mandated by sections 7 or 10 of the ESA 2 are functionally limited to the
applicant's project time-frame, which may be unrelated to even short-term
14. T.H. Watkins, What's Wrong with the Endangered Species Act?, AUDUBON, Jan.-Feb.
1996, at 37, 38-40.
15. Beattie, supra note 8, at 5.
16. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, (last modified Mar. 20, 1997) <http://www.fws.gov>.
17. Beattie, supra note 8.
18.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS:

ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PROGRAM 10 (1995) [hereinafter REPORT TO

CONGRESS]; United States Fish and Wildlife Service. supra note 16; Watkins, supra note 14, at 40.
19. See Losos, supra note 5, at 334; Kubasek & Browne, supra note 12, at 9: Wilson, supra
note 7 at 464-65; NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED'N, INVOLVING COMMUNrIS IN CONSERVATION 1
(1995).
20. Daniel J.Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why The EndangeredSpecies Act Doesn't WorkAnd What to do About It, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 273, 276 (1991) (quoting Margaret Shaffer,
Minimum Population Sizes for Species Conservation, 31 BIOsCIENCE 131 (1981)); see also MARGARET SHAFFER, MINIMUM VIABLE POPULATIONS: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY 69-86 (1987).

21.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1539 (1993).
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population trends. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) was criticized for short-sightedness in defending their decision to delist the brown
pelican based on the contention that mining impacts were unlikely in the
near furure.' In a similar fashion, offshore oil leases were permitted
because the admitted harm to protected whales was not "sufficiently
imminent or certain. "I

THE SPATIAL SCALE
Conflicts of Intent
In global terms, tropical countries are experiencing the majority of
extinctions by virtue of their biological richness and economic struggle.'
Given that the vast majority of our food, fiber, and medicines are derived
from organisms which originated outside of our borders, the explicit
recognition of international cooperation and conventions within the ESA is
a matter of enlightened self-interest. 6 Although the ESA provides limited
means of addressing international losses of biodiversity, the Act was
never intended to halt extinctions on a global scale, contrary to the implications of Kubasek and Browne.' The 959 endangered species in the
United States are almost certainly just the tip of the "extinction iceberg"
if we consider our nescience about insects, the most speciose group of
organisms. Insects comprise over half of the known species' but account
for only 3 percent of the identified endangered species.29
The spatial scale of the Act was intended to be predominantly national, comprehensively protecting species across ownership boundaries in
an extraordinary attempt at national self-restraint. 30 However, because
species on the verge of extinction are often limited to small tracts of land,
the ESA (sections 7 and 10) limits concern to the applicant's property

22. i.B. Ruhi, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act:
Pushing the Legal and PracticalLinirs of Species Protection, 23 LAND USE & ENVT. L. REV. 535,
545 (1992).
23. Rohlf, supra note 20, at 279 (citing North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326
(D.C.D. 1979)).
24. Id.
25. EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIODIVEL~ITY 8-10 (1988).
26. 16 U.S.C. §1537(1994).
27. Kubasek & Brown, supra note 12, at 8.
28. WILSON, supra note 25, at 4-5.
29. Beattie, supra note 8; REPORT TO CONGREss, supra note 18, at 30. But see, Robert E.
Gordon, Saving Endangered Species: What's Really Happening? AMC i., June 1994, 6, 7; Bethell,
supra note 6, at 20.
30. Padis, supra note 10. at 75; see also Oliver Houck, Reflections on The Endangered Species Act, 25 ENvTL. L. 689 (1995).
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boundary, a scale which may be unrelated to biogeographic constraints. 3
This presents a serious difficulty between the apparent intent of the Act
and the ecology of endangered species. In light of the large-scale importance of metapopulations with respect to buffering impacts, even species
which appear to be locally stable may not be adequately protected.32
The FWS and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) have
maintained nearly 40 percent of listed species in stable or improving condition.33 This success has been possible because the ESA is not limited to
the myopic preservation of species (claims to the contrary notwithstanding). 34 Rather, the Act is implemented at spatial scales which reflect the
ecology of the species.'

Conflicts of Implementation
Although individual properties are often small, two-thirds of the
United States is privately owned. Over one-third of all endangered species
are found exclusively on private property, and about three-quarters of
listed species rely on habitat found on these lands. 6 Therefore, it is surprising that the conflicts between ESA and property owners are rare. 37
Only 0.054% of some 100,000 consultations have yielded jeopardy opinions which halted the federal actions.38 From 1983-94 there were four
cases in which injunctions stopped or delayed activity on nonfederal lands
as posing a threat to endangered species that were under FWS protection.39 Although some factions have framed the debate as a trade-off
between species and jobs,' most of 4the accounts used to create this winlose scenario are demonstrably false. '
The implementation of the Act typically begins with a localized
remnant of a species, and the presumption seems to be that as the species
recovers, its range expands until the spatial scale assures survival. Thus,
the spatial scale of the ESA may be very large, including many private

31. Ruhl, supra note 22, at 545.
32. Rohlf, supra note 20, at 277.
33. Id.
34. Id.; Losos, supra note 5. at 333-34.
35. Patlis, supra note 10, at 35; Ruhl, supra note 22, at 536.
36. Houck, supra note 30, at 642.
37. SEE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FACTS ABOUT THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(1995) [hereinafter FACTS ABOUT THE ESA].
38. Id.; Houck, supra note 30, at 642.
39. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS, 13-14 (Dec. 1994).
40. Losos, supra note 5, at 335-36.
41. See generally FACTS ABOUT THE ESA, supra note 37.
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property owners. Indeed, the Department of Interior (DOI) defends small
land exemptions by arguing that most species will not survive on small
tracts of land.42 However, while temperate-zone species show less
endemism than tropical life-forms, there is no guarantee that a fully recovered species will not exist entirely on the property owned by a single
individual.
The spatial elements of the ESA and private property give rise to the
conflict of scale, wherein individual property owners perceive their endeavors to be of nominal impact, but the nation's biological wealth is
absolutely dependent on the aggregated actions of individual owners.'
Simply put, the interests of the nation are profoundly interwoven with the
actions of individuals. As our population expanded into the last frontiers,
the capacity of a property owner to act as an autonomous agent isolated
from the public good was lost. This spatial reality leads us to a consideration of the element of complexity or connectedness, a vital parameter in
ecological systems.
THE CONNECTEDNESS SCALE

Conflicts of Intent
Although the ESA explicitly includes ecosystems only in the preamble to the Act, some analysts have argued that protecting species was only
intended as a means to the ends of preserving biodiversity and ecosystem
wellbeing." Judicial interpretation and regulatory obligation in this regard
were slow in coming, 4 but there has been acknowledgment of the role of
ecosystems in the protection of biological diversity.' The 1978 Report of
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries stated that, "the
ultimate goal of the Act is the conservation of the ecosystem on which all
species, whether endangered or not, depend for survival,"' and this notion has been formalized through a FWS and NMFS joint policy statement.' Recently, some conservation biologists have criticized the Act for

42. Mary Helen Thompson, Administration Proposes Endangered Species Act Exemptions for
Small Landowners; "Guidepostsfor Reform" Would Give More Authority to States, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR NEW RELEASE Mar. 6, 1995, at 2.
43. Beattie, supra note 8, at 9.
44. Patlis, supra note 10, at 43.
45. Id.
46. Kubasek & Brown, supra note 12, at 8; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 20.
47. Endangered Species, Hearings on H.R. 10883 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation and the Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong.

(1978)
48.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (last modified Mar. 20, 1997) <http://www.fws.gov>.
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not focusing on the "larger picture" of ecosystems '9 However, given our
relatively poor understanding of ecosystem processes, the roles of various
species, and even what constitutes an "ecosystem,"" the protection of
indicator and umbrella species5 may provide the optimal balance between
preserving that which we can define and that which ultimately sustains an
ecosystem.
The connections between ourselves and other species are complex
but generally fall into three categories: ecological services, marketable
goods, and cultural context. The intent of the ESA appears to recognize the first two connections. As noted by Mann and Plummer, "the
web of species around us helps generate soil, regulate fresh water supplies, dispose of waste, and maintain the quality of the atmosphere.
Pillaging nature to the point where it cannot perform these functions
is dangerously foolish."52 Our direct dependence on biodiversity via
the utilitarian value of food and medicine is incontrovertible." Perhaps the least resolved but most compelling arguments are ethical and
spiritual.54 In a succinct integration of these notions into a single
framework, the National Wildlife Federation argues that protecting
species is part of our civic responsibility."
Conflicts of Implementation
Species, endangered or not, represent a form of common property,
or public trust, which connects their "owners" with complex obligations
that may conflict with the private property upon which these species are
found. Great bodies of law in this area revolve around an ethic of moderation, proportionality, prudence, and responsibility to others who are
entitled to share in a common resource. 6 In ecological terms, the implementation of the ESA appears to be reductionistic, with only an implicit
recognition that biodiversity cannot be understood or managed as parts.
However, even though protecting species does not assure the preservation

49. Losos, supra note 5, at 333-34.
50. ALLEN & HOEKSTRA, supra note 3, at 53.
51. Patis, supra note 10, at 39-42.
52. Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.
1992, at 47, 51.
53. WILSON, supra note 25, at 3, 15.
54. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. JOHNSON, A MORALLY DEEP WORLD: AN ESSAY ON MORAL
SIGNIFICANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1991); Mann & Plummer, supra note 52, at 51; NATIONAL WILDLFE FED'N, supra note 19, at 3.
55. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED'N, supra note 19, at 2.

56. See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Questfor Environmental Ethics,
24 ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
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of the affected ecosystems 57 given the interconnections among components, preserving the "weak link" in the chain may be an effective means
of sustaining otherwise intractably complex systems.
Beattie has argued that endangered species are the symptoms of one
of the most difficult and critical environmental problems that humans have
ever faced, a position echoed by dozens of scientists."8 While the cause
and extent of global warming, ozone holes, and carcinogenic contaminants provide rich fodder for scientific debate, there appears to be no
serious dissension regarding the reality and impacts of the biodiversity
crisis. In the words of Wilson, "If the message of the ESA is that the
miners' canaries are about to die and that people might want to change
the way they do their mining, the bio-phobic response is: kill the canaries. The 59best scientific evidence available suggests that this is a risky
answer."
Thus, to the extent that we are dependent on a biologically rich
world, the implementation of the ESA would not appear to be in conflict
with human interests. However, this presumes that connections between
our human and ecosystem wellbeing, vis-a-vis species, are independent of
time and space. In actuality, interdependencies increase with our
spatiotemporal perspective. For example, my immediate happiness is
unlikely to diminish with yesterday's extinction, but the condition of my
children may become intimately connected to this loss in ways we cannot
predict. Moreover, while discounting the future may be a defensible strategy when applied in an economic context, it is not at all clear that we can
discount moral value in this manner.
In this light, the implementation of the ESA is not the problem. That
is, endangered species are warning flags and it is our awareness of environmental degradation, not its occurrence, that is evoked by the ESA. To
build on the argument of Beattie, we can choose to rescind the ESA but
we can not repeal the laws of nature or deny the loss of species - there
are essential limits to anthropogenic alterations.6°

57. See James R. Karr, Biological Integrity and the Goal of Environmental Legislation:Lessons for Conservation Biology, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 244 (1990).
58. Beattie, supra note 8, at 6, 9.
59. Wilson, supra note 7.
60. Beattie, supra note 15, at 6, 9.
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A SUMMARY OF SCALE-BASED CONFLICTS

At least three perspectives (property owner, society, and biocentrist)
can be brought to bear on the issues related to the ESA and private property. Although rational positions can be derived from the scale of each
observer, their essential focus changes with scale.
From the perspective of the private property owner, the protection
of an endangered species can involve the potential of a Fifth Amendment
taking (e.g., the taking of the right to convert a habitat into a golf
course). From this perspective, it makes sense to pit the species' commodity value against that of the proposed action. 1 However, including
economic parameters in the listing process is ultimately nonsensical. 62 The
endangered status of a species is not a function of whether it interferes
with profits. Recent attempts by Congress to avoid discovering the condition of species by eliminating the National Biological Survey or prohibiting it from using volunteers are similarly irrational.' What makes sense
is the existing opportunity to adapt the implementation of the ESA to
avoid financially devastating impacts to private owners. Critical habitat
can be excluded on social and economic grounds, unless it would cause
extinction.64
The private property owner must bear the burden of protecting a
species for the benefit of society, while receiving no direct compensation
for this service. Individualizing costs while collectivizing the benefits is
the basis for the "tragedy of the commons," which may lead to the destruction of the common resource.' Given that the uncertain anthropocentric benefits of protecting any particular species are spatiotemporally
diffuse, it is not surprising that a means for compensating private property
owners has yet to be developed. Such a system must take into account a
complex assortment of issues, not the least of which is whether payment
should be considered for any diminishment of economic value or whether
some losses are a reasonable consequence of living in a human and biological conimunity.'
The demands for compensation by a private property owner who
views compliance with the ESA as a Fifth Amendment constitutional "tak-

61. Mann & Plummer, supra note 52, at 65; Wilson, supra note 7,at 464.
62. Losos, supra note 5, at 335.
63. Babbitt, supra note 13, at 356.
64. Rohlf, supra note 20, at 279; Losos, supra note 5, at 334.
65. Mann & Plummer, supra note 52, at 51; Rose, supra note 56, at 7 (citing Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScIENcE 1243 (1968)).
66. Kubasek & Browne, supra note 12.
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ing" of prospective profits by hindering activities would seem to be reasonable from the individual's perspective. 6' However, as the perspective
shifts to a social scale, this notion may collapse. Such individual claims
would seem to be more than offset by the tens of billions of dollars provided by federal subsidies to private property owners. Direct support for
development of private property (e.g., coastal housing developments, ski
resorts, etc.) is considerable, but this subsidy is relatively modest compared with the massive tax credits to private property owners, which
amounted to $74.4 billion in 1994.6
From a social perspective, the actions of the private property owner
leading to an extinction may be perceived as a permanent "taking" of common property (i.e., the notion of the ESA section 9 taking). From a national
perspective, the Act adopts a broad anthropocentric position in asserting that
"[endangered] species are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people." As we shall
see, however, the ESA appears to capture much more than just instrumental
value. Ultimately, the social perspective is utilitarian - we attempt to garner
the greatest good for the greatest number. Our social and historical biases
orient our utilitarianism to monetary units, which provide a uniform, if not
entirely satisfactory, means of measuring value.
While the economic analysis of the ESA from a public perspective is
surely one of the most complex analytical tasks of our day, even basic
budgetary issues are fraught with confusion.69 Often, the necessary context is lacking with the most dramatic economic impacts of the ESA
paling in comparison to the downsizing of corporate America; the spotted
owl may cost 9,000 jobs by 2010 -- IBM cut 36,000 jobs in 1994.70 Notions that the Act "demands a significant share of a federal budget"" are
unfounded. Over the last two decades, on an annual basis the FWS and
NMFS have never spent more on maintaining our biological infrastructure
through the ESA than the cost of building two to four miles of federal
interstate highway in the name of maintaining our transportation infrastructure.'
Our government has allocated about 2 percent of the funds needed to
conduct recovery plans for all listed species.' The distribution of these

67. Mann & Piummer, supra note 52, at 65; Wilson, supra note 7, at 464.
68. Houck, supra note 30, at 697.
69. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 29, at 7.

70. Watkins, supra note 14, at 38-39.
71. Ruhl, supra note 22, at 3.
72. Watkins, supra note 14, at 41; NATIONAL WILDLFE FED'N, supra note 19, at 30.

73. Kubasek & Browne, supra note 12, at 15.
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limited funds is extremely skewed to the charismatic species; some 270
plants and 89 invertebrates received just 5 percent of total funding.74 One
might argue that these allocations accurately reflect public concern, except
that the federal funding for all endangered species is just 2.5 percent of
the value our society places on a single endangered species, the whooping
crane. 7 Based on this economic analysis, the most expensive recovery
plan, which involves the green and loggerhead sea turtles, has a cost that
is just 10 percent of our society's perceived value of the whooping crane,
the only species for which such information is available.
From a biocentric perspective, many philosophers, including the
preeminent conservation biologist Aldo Leopold, discount any attempts to justify species on economic grounds arguing that, "To ask
what a species is good for is the height of ignorance."76 Although the
story of the Pacific yew (a "trash" tree of the Pacific Northwest from
which taxol, a potent treatment for breast and ovarian cancers, was
derived) suggests the anthropocentric value of some species, Mann
and Plummer note that no market will save the Oregon silverspot
butterfly - it does not cure cancer, it is not nutritious, and nobody
will pay to see it. 77 Although the ESA seems to fall short of explicitly
acknowledging the intrinsic value of species, one might conclude that
an implicit recognition of moral and spiritual values arises from the
denial of purely instrumental values.78
According to the Supreme Court, the Act was "a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over 'primary
missions' of federal agencies "and prevent extinction" whatever the
cost."" As such, it has been argued that the ESA threatens the moral

authority of humans by questioning our independence from, and supremacy over, Nature. Clearly, this challenges the outlandish commentators such as Rush Limbaugh who maintain the fanatical position
that, "If the owl can't adapt to the superiority of humans, then screw
it." 80 While our society explores the notion that species are sacred
(with intriguing reflections on the Noah story among others), critics
74. Losos, supra note 5, at 224.
75. John R. Stoll & Lee Ann Johnson, Concepts of Value, Nonmarket Valuation, and the Case
of the Whooping Crane, TRANSACTIONS OF THE N. AM. WILDUIFE AND NAT. RESOURCES CONF.
382, 387 (1984).
76. See, Johnson, supra note 54 (providing a particularly well-conceived and rigorous analysis
of the intrinsic value of species from the perspective of wellbeing interests).

77.
78.
79.
U.S. 153,
80.

Mann & Plummer, supra note 52, at 68.
Ruhl, supra note 22, at 536.
Kubasek & Browne, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
154, 185 (1978)).
Beattie, supra note 8. at 6, 9.
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assert that the ESA fails to recognize the "sanctity" of private property, 8' a remarkable, and as yet unexplained, theological position.
THE SOLUTIONS: INTEGRATION OF SCALES

If the conflicts arising between the ESA and private property owners
are a function of the values and concerns that arise from different scales
of perception, then it follows that there may be two means for resolving
these conflicts. First, it may be possible to implement the ESA in ways
that explicitly take into consideration the small-scale concerns of those
who own private property. Second, by increasing the scale at which we
perceive private property, it may be possible to find the common ground
between these lands and the ecosystems upon which all species depend.
Scaling Down the ESA
Although the ESA is, "on its face," a large-scale conceptualization,
it is conceivably possible to implement the Act with attention to the
unique perspectives of the private property owner. Appropriate mechanisms are possible within the constraints of the Act, and several prototypes have been developed. Although the administration of these mechanisms is, in some cases, problematic, they provide a compelling set of
approaches to closing the gap between the perceptual scales.
The most direct means of recognizing the scale of private property is
the Small Landowner Exemption, through which the ESA allows hardship
exemptions for individuals.' The National Wildlife Federation's (NWF)
"Community-based Recovery Planning" proposal recommends priority
consideration for exempting small, residential property owners from the
constraints of the Act.' In cases where exemptions are not feasible, such
private property owners are provided with compensation through tax
incentives and direct assistance.' The DOI appears to be amenable to
such an approach.'
The use of public lands as the sites for preservation and recovery is
another direct means of shifting the pressure of protecting endangered
species from private property. This approach effectively avoids the "tragedy of the commons" by collectivizing both the costs and benefits. Ac-

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Kriz, supra note 4, at 3092.
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cording to the DOI, in all cases where appropriate habitats can be found,
plans are constructed so that public lands carry the burden of management.' Although density transfers and land exchanges may be difficult for
small property owners, these indirect means of shifting the burden of the
ESA to public lands also can be effective."
The concern of private property owners appears to be, in large part,
a function of the perceived "worst case" scenario of confronting the ESA.
The fear of private property owners with respect to the ESA has led to
the intentional destruction of habitat to prevent colonization by endangered species." As such, proactive implementation via localized planning
may reduce the real and perceived risks of future conflicts and avoid the
environmental destruction that the Act was intended to prevent. In 1982,
Congress created a process within the ESA that allowed the incidental
taking of threatened and endangered species under the provisions of the
Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP).' 9
In accordance with an HCP, the private property owner is allowed to harm otherwise protected species, as long as such activities
do not appreciably diminish the species' survival. While this mechanism has been criticized because it does not prohibit actions which
would diminish a species' recovery,90 it represents a tremendous compromise of the underlying principles of the Act in deference to the
interests of private property owners. Those who would presumably
benefit from HCPs are less than enthusiastic with this approach, as it
tends to be perceived as being expensive and slow. As a result, these
plans appear to work better for large rather than small landowners. 9'
Recognizing these logistical problems, the DOI advocates the use of
federal funds to support HCP development to bring the ESA timescale into concordance with that of private property owners.92 In addition, the integration of federal agencies involved in implementing the
ESA through a thirteen-agency Memorandum of Understanding 93 is
also intended to accelerate decision-making and avoid the regulatory
94
"freeze" which is particularly onerous for small property owners.

86. Babbitt, supra note 13, at 362.
87. Id.
88. Kriz, supra note 4, at 3092.
89. Mann & Plummer, supra note 52; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (last modified Mar. 20,
1997)<http:f/www.fws.gov>.
90. Rohlf, supra note 20, at 278; Babbitt, supra note 13, at 366.
91. FACrS ABOUT THE ESA, supra note 37 (np.).
92. Babbitt, supra note 13, at 365.

93. Patlis, supra note 10, at 58.
94.

Babbitt, supra note 13, at 366.
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Taking the notion of proactive involvement one step further, the
most constructive and potentially powerful means of relating the ESA to
the concerns of private property is the development of incentives. The
need to shift the emphasis from punishment to positive reinforcement is
probably the most widely endorsed modification of the ESA's implementation, with support coming from the National Wildlife Federation, the
Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Department of
Interior, and the National Wilderness Institute.9
Finally, an innovative approach to further assuage the concerns of
private property owners has been developed and implemented within the
broad provisions of the ESA. Rather than having to endure potentially
large, future costs of preservation and restoration, some HCPs allow
individuals who possess small tracts on which endangered species may
depend to "pre-pay" the costs of mitigation. These fees provide management agencies with necessary funds and provide property owners with a
known, up-front cost. For example, a mitigation fee of $600/ac is in
effect for the 70,000 ac of Coachella Valley fringe-toed lizard habitat.6 In
the case of Stephen's Kangaroo rat, the mitigation fee for homebuyers
was $215, or less than 0.25% of the cost of a new home.9 This approach
straddles the line of compromise between the ESA and private property.
From the perspective of the property owner, such mitigation fees may
appear to be reverse compensation, but from the collective perspective,
the private property owner is charged a small, fixed cost for the privilege
of pursuing individual interests which may eventually prevent the recovery of endangered species.
Scaling Up Private Property
Karr asserts that, "Throughout history, the human-environment
interaction has generally been significant only at relatively small spatial
and temporal scales [but] Mankind's principal interaction with his environment is no longer at the scale of individuals."'8 Conceptually, we can
consider three approaches to expanding the scale of private property to
close the gap with concerns regarding endangered species. By considering
property in the context of long times, large areas, or complex connections, what is good for humans tends to converge with what is good for
other species.

95.

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED'N, supra note 19, at 22; Watkins, supra note 14, at 41; Kriz,
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With respect to time, the ESA includes mechanisms that expand the
temporal dimension beyond the lifetime of the private property owner. An
HCP can apply to land for decades, s9 allowing a measure of security for
both the individual and the species. To balance individual rights with
social obligations, perhaps it is valuable to borrow a page from the National Environmental Policy Act, which accepts the environment as a
form of property. However, this property is viewed as a trusteeship with
obligations between generations.100 Species are part of the American
heritage, and we can no more justify generating a massive environmental
deficit than we can rationalize passing along an excessive monetary
debt.' In still more familiar terms, conflicts between private property
and endangered species would seem to be substantially diminished if we
took seriously the notion that the land is not something we inherit from
our ancestors but something that we borrow from our children."0
In terms of expanding our perceptions of private property along
the spatial dimension, it is essential to understand that the American
frontier is closed - the option of moving to new lands should the
environment become unable to support us is no longer viable.' 013 This
represents a tremendous change in the manner in which our society
perceives property. As noted by Mann and Plummer, "Until recent
decades, Americans were untroubled by such questions. The nation
was still empty [and] there seemed no need to choose between a species and economic growth. But now the country's empty corners are
filling up, and biologists warn that in the next decade or two the fate
of thousands of species will be decided.""0 4
Again the ESA provides means for expanding the spatial scope of
the property owner. Regional HCPs cover multiple species across entire
landscapes." ° This approach is cumbersome, as it necessarily involves
many people and demands informed community support,'1 6 but such may
be the price of conducting the business of government in a crowded
world. Ironically, this approach has been favored by both land developers
and environmentalists, with the former being cynically accused of attempting to avoid the ESA and the latter trying to enforce its
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prohibitions."~ But given that the potential to act autonomously on our
"own land" is an anachronistic luxury, there can be little doubt that, "We
have to begin to think of ourselves as inhabitants of ecosystems and begin
to live, think, and act accordingly.""'
Finally, it may be possible, and perhaps even necessary, to re-perceive private property in the context of our increasing intensity of
connectedness. Rose provided an incisive summary of the private property
and ESA conflict in noting that, "Environmentalism is only a particularly
pointed example of a recurring problem in free and democratic governments: the importance of self-imposed citizen restraints for the sake of a
common good.""1 The DOI has expressly pursued increased community
involvement in the development of plans for habitat conservation and
species recovery." 0 The National Wildlife Foundation has called for the
evolution of the HCP process into "Community-based Recovery Planning", which fully involves people in the entire process."' As difficult as
trade-offs between personal and community interests might be to resolve,
they are not new or unfamiliar. "Our society has a fundamental premise:
Regulatory action taken for a valid public purpose can have consequences
that legally inconvenience people and, from time to time, do diminish
someone's rights", and in this regard one might view the ESA as an
extension of a well-known constraint - planning and zoning laws."'
The perception of the species or ecosystems as property, even largescale or community property, is fiercely resisted by some environmentalists, but the legal and ethical tradition of private property in western
culture is a rich source of ideas for narrowing the gap between species
preservation and property rights."' Contrary to what has become conventional environmental wisdom, not all commons end in tragedy. Species
may be preserved through the same mechanisms that sustain these surviving commons - normative appeals regarding thrift, carefulness, overuse,
and sustainability. As noted by Rose,
even individual property revolves around these normative characteristics [of common property). The individual property-holder
relies in great part on the recognition and acquiescence of others,
and individual property law assumes a large measure of neighbor-
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liness and attentiveness to1 1 4the needs of others in the use of one's
own 'exclusive' property.
At its best, the integration of an individual's private property rights with
one's commensurate obligations to the community includes a normative
"deep structure" familiar to environmental ethics.
SUMMARY
In an immediate sense, enlightened self-interest would seem to be a
compelling argument for protecting our biological infrastructure. We must
ask whether the richest nation on earth is more desperately in need of further economic wealth or natural assets." 5 However, it seems that perhaps
something more profound than sophisticated self-interest is at hand. There
appears to be an ongoing, national examination of what constitutes "self."
Indigenous people tend to view the world in terms of kinship, with
species being neither untouchable gifts nor exploitable givens." 6 The
distinction between self and other is blurred, such that to harm another is
to harm oneself. As our society is coming to realize, there is no place left
to move so we are tied to land in a way that has not been true since the
rise of western culture, it appears that we are in the process of becoming
indigenous. Indeed, Leopold's land ethic was in many ways an ethic of
kinship in the tradition of native people; Nature was understood to be an
ends in itself, not simply a means to our ends."' This sense of "place" by
which our modem society seems to be defining itself is a difficult, even
painful, process. However, the ESA is central to this struggle, and while
its implementation needs ongoing attention, its principles are sound - the
wellbeing of humans and other species are inextricably linked.

114. Id. at 27-28 (citing Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Properly, 52 U. CH. L.
REV. 73 (1985)).
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FIGURE 1
Stereotypical portrayal of the "classic" perspective of the ESA, in which a small, remnant population
of a single species is protected. Nonoverlapping volumes in this figure, as compared with Figs. 3 and
4, suggest the potential for conflict between those holding such perspectives in the classical implementation of the ESA.
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"Progressive" ESA perspective
FIGURE 2

Stereotypical portrayal of the "classic" perspective of the ESA, in which a recovering species is
managed across its faull range and in the context of the entire biotic community. Nonoverlapping
volumes in this figure, as compared with Figs. 3 and 4, suggest the potential for conflict between
those holding such perspectives in the progressive implementation of the ESA.
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FIGURE 3
Stereotypical portrayal of the private property perspective of the land, in which an owner occupies
property for noncommercial uses. Nonoverlapping volumes in this figure, as compared with Figs. 1
and 2, suggest the potential for conflict between those holding such perspectives in the progressive
implementation of the ESA.
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FIGURE 4
Stereotypical portrayal of the private producer perspective of the land, in which an owner produces a
commodity on the property. Nonoverlapping volumes in this figure, as compared with Figs. I and 2,
suggest the potential for conflict between those holding such perspectives in the progressive implementation of the ESA.
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